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A landscape cannot be a homeland
John Wylie
Department of Geography, University of Exeter, UK
One’s implementation in a landscape, one’s attachment to place … is the very splitting of humanity into natives 
and strangers. (Emmanuel Levinas, 1999, p. 232)
1. Introduction
What is the problem for which landscape is the answer?
I first heard this question posed at a European Science Foundation / Uniscape exploratory meeting, 
in Brussels, in 2011. It was not, I should say, a question formally tabled in advance for the delegates to 
address; nor was it found in the title of any specific presentation. It was not even voiced by one of the 
many academic specialists in landscape from across Europe present on that day. It was raised instead 
in the course of group discussions by an observing European Commission research policy officer called 
Karen Fabbri. I remember all of this, several years later, because I wrote it down at the time. The question 
struck me quite forcefully, and it has stayed with me ever since—I am sure, too, that some others who 
were present will also remember it. In this paper, I want to begin to formulate a response.
To do this, I will propose a distinction between ‘landscape’ and ‘homeland’ as terms. This might initially 
seem an oblique point to focus upon, because these two terms would not perhaps be perceived to be 
customarily linked, or even that closely associated. But I would argue that ‘homeland’ epistemologies 
and presumptions are a difficult feature of many approaches to and understandings of landscape, across 
the different branches of landscape research. Almost per se, for example, landscape is land that has 
been settled, inhabited—in no way can it be synonymous with ‘nature’ or ‘the wild’. And near the end 
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2  J. WyLIE
of one of the most notable statements on landscape made over the past 30 years—Tim Ingold’s (1993) 
The Temporality of the Landscape—homeland suddenly appears as a defining hallmark of landscape:
[T]he landscape, to recall the words of Merleau-Ponty (1962, p. 24) is not so much the object as ‘the homeland of 
our thoughts’. (Ingold, p. 171, emphasis in original)
I will explore and explain the specific import and meaning of ‘homeland’ within Ingold’s statement later 
in this paper. But as an opening gambit, I would argue that the varying fields of landscape research 
could usefully pursue an agenda in which landscape is understood in terms of a perpetual unsettling 
and questioning of the senses of belonging, identification, connection and communion we might 
associate with the term ‘homeland’. I would wish to articulate landscape instead through a critical and 
affective disposition which, in Andrew Benjamin’s (2011, p. 153) words, always harbours ‘an ineliminable 
distancing’. The salience of landscape as a critical term, I have come to believe, involves modes of 
thinking and feeling that chafe against invocations of homeland as a site of existential inhabitation, as 
a locus of sentiment and attachment, as a wellspring of identity. A landscape cannot be a homeland, 
must not be confused with a home, a hearth, and so by extension, landscape writing must work to 
unsettle ideas about identifiable and unified communities, regions, nations and worlds.
The argument I am making in this paper is, to some extent at least, normative and idealistic in 
tenor. In other words, I am proposing here a particular perspective which landscape research could—
or should—explore further. My primary concern is to work towards articulating this perspective. In 
what follows, I will first of all clarify the problem I see landscape research as facing. This will involve 
some reflections on landscape as discussed and defined within the European Landscape Convention. 
I will then develop a specific account of ‘homeland thinking’ within phenomenological approaches 
to landscape. A last substantive section looks to critically analyse the term homeland itself, following 
Amy Kaplan’s (2003) work.
In the concluding section of the paper, beyond summarising my main points, I will anticipate some 
potential issues and objections. These include both the critical dilemmas raised by a disavowal of 
homeland, and the empirical actualities of landscape settlement. But I will maintain the value of thinking 
landscape beyond homelands, as one possible direction for landscape research.
2. The problem
What is the problem for which landscape could be the answer? It can be given a specific name: 
ontopology. This name, this term—first coined to the best of my knowledge by Jacques Derrida (1994) 
in Spectres of Marx—combines ontology and topos. In other words, it combines existence and location. 
In and through this combination, ontopology asserts an original and indefinitely sustained link between, 
and perhaps even a fusion of, a site and its inhabitants. It proposes that there is such a thing as ‘original 
inhabitants’. In their strongest form, ontopological forms of thought thus advance arguments that 
are predicated upon some essential, given connection between peoples and landscapes. Beyond 
such a strong or essentialist articulation, ontopological thinking more generally proceeds from the 
assumption—or, alternately, sets out to demonstrate—that certain peoples and certain landscapes 
belong together and are made for each other, if not naturally, or in an environmentally determinist 
fashion, then at the least historically in a deep sense: they have evolved together, they bear each other’s 
imprint, they are inextricably interwoven.
The most obvious and readily identifiable form of ontopological thinking occurs, of course, within 
ethnic nationalism of an extremist ‘blood and soil’ variety. In this vein, for example, the political 
geographer and visual theorist David Campbell (1998) carefully identifies and deconstructs the forms 
of ontopology mobilised in the course of the conflicts that marked the break-up of yugoslavia. But 
while such nationalisms are perhaps the clearest expression of a thinking that seeks to handcuff people, 
culture, time and land together, it is also clear that such thinking is readily visible across a range of 
scales, both below and beyond the level of the ‘nation’. In fact, it could even be argued that the regular 
concept of scale itself harbours ontopological assumptions, insofar as it presumes a hierarchy of 
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identifications, from a localised and hometown ‘sense of place’ all the way to a planetary level of concern 
and attachment—to the scale of the earth itself, conceived as the homeland of human life. In this wider 
sense, then, I would like to characterise ontopological thinking more generally and colloquially here as 
homeland thinking. This is not a univocal phenomena, as noted above. The yoking-together of existence 
and location occurs in a variety of forms; notably it may be advanced in both progressive and reactionary 
registers, and it is as often implicit and unacknowledged as it is both openly espoused and critiqued.
For example, it seemed to me that a certain equation of ‘landscape’ and ‘homeland’ was present 
in some of the responses to Karen Fabbri’s question itself in Brussels. For some present—and I am 
conscious I am speaking quite generally here—the value of landscape, or of a landscape approach, 
lay precisely in its recognition of local distinctiveness, local attachments—geographically specific 
weldings of peoples and environments. In this sense, landscape is not just a defensive preservation 
of particular cultural heritages, it is also a more progressive empowerment of communities, in the 
face of supra-national and impersonal economic and political forces indifferent to ‘landscape’ as a 
localised weave of life, land, memory and practice. Landscape research thus rallies around the lively 
heterogeneity of both long-lived and emergent localities, as set against the purportedly homogenising 
spread of contemporary neoliberal modernities and their associated non-places. And further in this 
vein, landscape is articulated as something quintessentially affective—that is, as a matter of human 
and non-human feelings, attachments and qualities, as opposed to the quantities tape-measured by 
(for instance) an ecosystem services approach.
But for all that I felt the pull of such arguments (and I’ll confess to being mostly a listener, or bystander, 
on that day in Brussels)–– I still felt sceptical and concerned. Even as I listened to assurances that 
this kind of vision for landscape was not based upon any exclusivity, or nostalgia, or any suspicion of 
mobility, transience or difference. And even as I found myself nodding, when I heard that the problem 
for which landscape was the answer was top-down, undemocratic authority and the tendency for 
European governance today to operate via the remote sensings of entitled elites and experts. I still 
worried at the ready invocation of terms like neighbourhood and lifeworld in this heartfelt discourse, 
and I came away with the thought reinforced that landscape had to be about displacing as much as 
dwelling (see Wylie, 2012a).
Later on, I went back to the ur-text of the European Landscape Convention:
‘Landscape’ means an area, as perceived by people, whose character is the result of the action and interaction of 
natural and/or human factors. (Council of Europe, 2000, p. 3)
Each party undertakes: to recognise landscapes in law as an essential component of people’s surroundings, an 
expression of the diversity of their shared cultural and natural heritage, and a foundation of their identity. (ibid., p. 4)
Many readers of this journal will be much more familiar than I am with the evolution, promulgation and 
implementation of the Convention. As a text, it seems to me a remarkable combination of strengths and 
weaknesses. Its committee-language results in an inclusivity such that almost every reader can discover 
their preferred vision for landscape in there somewhere (landscape is both an area and a perception, 
both quantitative and qualitative, natural and cultural, planned and spontaneous, past, present and 
future). And who could wish to take serious issue with the sentiments and values of the statements 
quoted above? Again, I will stress here both my own comparative lack of technical expertise, and also 
the critical and progressive nature of the scholarship that has looked to examine and take forward the 
agenda of the Convention. But I must also note how, in the second excerpt above, landscape is spoken 
of as a ‘foundation of identity’—and how in general the language of cultural heritage permeates the 
text. I will note as well that, in this already-legalistic document, replete with references to regulations, 
policies and management, the word ‘law’ itself appears just the once, precisely in the excerpt above, as 
the first undertaking of the signatories. The law will recognise that landscape is a foundation of people’s 
identity. Not the foundation, admittedly, but a foundation all the same—and here for a singular rather 
than pluralised identity.
This, for me, is an instance of the ways in which what I have called ‘homeland thinking’ habitually 
and as it were surreptitiously infiltrates landscape discourse. Another example that I have found myself 
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4  J. WyLIE
particularly attentive to involves the language of ‘connection’ and ‘re-connection’ with landscape, 
environment and the ‘natural world’. This is a rhetoric that often characterises writing—academic, 
popular and governmental—advocating the aesthetic, ethical or therapeutic value of changed or 
‘deepened’ human relationships with non-human worlds. And in the conclusion to their recent guest 
editorial for Landscape Research, presenting the latest work relating to the Landscape Convention 
across Europe, Pedroli, Antrop, and Pinto Correia (2013) notably adopt this exact rhetoric. They talk of 
aiming for ‘the reconnection of people with their landscape’ (p. 693), and they argue that landscape 
researchers ‘should continue providing conceptual frameworks, methods and analysis that support 
this reconnection’ (ibid.).
Here, we see a unifying imperative for landscape research being articulated. I would never wish to 
deny the value of greater public participation in landscape matters, or to argue against a need for deeper 
knowledge and understanding of landscapes. The questions I wish to raise are ones about underlying 
assumptions regarding the meaning of landscape that I worry lie unexamined, sometimes, within our 
agendas, howsoever sincerely they may be aimed at more democratic, redistributive and participatory 
ways of landscaping human lives. But what claims can people lay upon a landscape––in what sense can 
it be called ‘theirs’? And how did people become divorced or sundered from the landscape, such that 
some kind of reconnection is now needed? What assumptions—ethical, ecological and, I would argue, 
ontopological—inform this kind of desire? In the next section, I want to think further about assumptions 
by considering the role that homeland specifically plays in phenomenological approaches to landscape.
3. The homeland of their thoughts
It could well be that Tim Ingold (1993) neither perceived nor intended any particular resonance to 
the term ‘homeland’ when he lighted upon it as a succinct way of capturing a sense of landscape in 
phenomenological terms—landscape as the sustenance, lifepath and medium of its inhabitants, as 
‘the homeland of their thoughts’, every bit as much as their own bodies must be too. Much work on 
landscape over the past 20 years, especially in cultural geography, anthropology, archaeology and 
literary studies, including some of my own Wylie, (2002, 2003), has set forth from an assumption that a 
landscape is a homeland, in the sense that human life and practice always already occurs in and through 
engagements with landscape. Before going further, though, it must be noted that over the 20 years 
since The Temporality of the Landscape’s publication, Ingold’s own position has evolved considerably. 
In the last 10 years, for example, themes of flow, process and becoming have become dominant in his 
writing. Iinhabitants have been revisioned as wayfarers, dwelling substituted by making (see in particular 
Ingold, 2007, 2011). To put this more formally, a classically phenomenological emphasis upon being and 
embeddedness has been superseded, in Ingold’s later work, by a perhaps more holistic vision which 
looks to encompass ‘life’ in general, animal, vegetable and mineral, and which draws upon art and craft 
practice and forms of vitalist thinking in laying ontological stress on the ongoing, the emergent, the 
efflorescent.
Nonetheless, the initial equation of landscape with homeland remains—I think—revealing here. 
A homeland (as I will discuss further below) is of course something to which one returns, and from its 
inception phenomenology has invoked myths of return. Merleau-Ponty does so on the opening page 
of the Phenomenology of Perception, in stating that ‘all [phenomenology’s] efforts are concentrated 
upon re-achieving a direct and primitive contact with the world, and endowing that contact with a 
philosophical status’ (1962[1941] p. vi, emphasis added). Here, therefore, we have both a myth of return 
and of primitivism. The important point to clarify here is that this return is a re-discovery, a realisation 
anew of the fact that we are, as a condition of being alive at all, worldly creatures, earthlings, inextricably 
enmeshed with land, water, atmosphere.
Conceived phenomenologically, therefore, landscape almost inevitably becomes homeland in one 
way, because this is a philosophy premised from the outset upon the argument that we are always 
already embedded in the world, in a state of mutuality that cannot be disavowed. The very term being-
in-the-world itself declares an indissoluble link, a mutual intrication of existence and location, such 
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that one cannot legitimately conceive of these as separate entities. No being without world. While 
‘world’ in this context cannot, of course, simply be equated with geographical site or position, and 
still less with ‘natural environment’, Martin Heidegger’s varied analyses and descriptions, especially in 
his later writings, routinely evoke a self embedded in a landscape as exemplary of ‘world’—indeed his 
philosophy can seem landscaped in a distinctive way, totemically gathered and staged within a particular 
tableaux—rural, forested, with streams, clearings, cabins and distant mountains.
For Jeff Malpas (2006, p. 315), this kind of landscaping in Heidegger’s work is very much in keeping 
with the trajectory of his overall philosophy. This, he concludes, is ‘a journey that turns always homewards’. 
Equally, Brendan O'Donoghue (2011) characterises Heidegger’s work as ‘a poetics of homecoming’. I 
have to note here that Heidegger’s early writings do emphasise in particular the estranged, uncanny, 
‘unhomely’ nature of human being-in-the-world—the fact that we exist in a world not of our own 
making, and must strive to overcome this. And Malpas and O’Donaghue, conscious of the ways in which 
Heidegger’s life and work are bound up with the awful histories of national socialism in Germany, both 
want to argue that the ‘homecoming’ invoked here is not a return to any specific landscape of belonging, 
but rather to a particular style of being. But it remains difficult to argue that the language and concepts 
of classical phenomenology lead in any direction other than the ontopological—to a coincidence of 
self and body, for example, and also to a communion of self and landscape.
Turning back to Tim Ingold’s work, this is far removed from any kind of questionable Heideggerian 
genius loci. The tone here is now more ‘relational’, so to speak—stress is placed upon inextricable 
interrelatedness, rather than embeddedness, or rootedness. If humans are ‘at home’ in their landscapes, 
then this is because there is no imaginable alternative, no other world available to which one might have 
recourse. Ingold’s writing remains in this sense committed to the argument that modern epistemologies 
and ways of life have marooned us within wrong-headed notions—for example, the idea that the 
material world is somehow ‘external’ to us. This cannot be so for Ingold, because humans and other 
creatures are perpetually engaged in making themselves a home in the world. Dwelling, and more 
latterly wayfaring, is a matter of ongoing craft and creation. And what we can call landscape is thus 
both the context and product of this dwelling and journeying—this homemaking.
Before I move on, to conclude this section, it is important to note that only a minority of landscape 
researchers subscribe to a phenomenological perspective. Perhaps the clear majority of landscape 
research takes place informed by different precepts—a preponderance could be said to adopt a 
more scientific, empirical and policy-related approach; a strong strain offers a critical and materialist 
analysis focusing on issues of justice and iniquity, and of course landscape can also be conceived and 
interpreted in visual and aesthetic terms, as a representational and symbolic framing of the world. 
A more extensive examination of homeland thinking within landscape research might look to work 
more fully through major approaches and epistemologies—and I would like to suggest my arguments 
in this paper are relevant for landscape studies well beyond any narrowly defined perspective. But 
equally it can be argued also that the very idea of landscape cannot be disentangled from, or purged 
of phenomenological baggage. As I have written elsewhere (Wylie, 2012b), our conceptions of both 
landscape and phenomenology share some distinctive points of origin in nineteenth-century romantic 
thought especially. And the ur-texts of landscape theory through the twentieth-century—work by Carl 
Sauer, J.B. Jackson, yi-Fu Tuan—all in different ways understand landscape as an experiential locus of 
life and meaning. With this in mind, I want to turn now to examine the term ‘homeland’ itself.
4. Homeland insecurities
I take the title of this section from Amy Kaplan’s (2003) essay of the same name, and I will also be guided 
here by her elucidation of homeland. Kaplan’s essay finds its context in the events of 11 September 2001, 
and the subsequent establishment of ‘Homeland Security’ as an official military and political goal in the 
USA and elsewhere. In this context, ‘homeland’ is a term that clearly acquires new and increased symbolic 
resonance. I have neither the space nor the expertise to examine this current geopolitical and discursive 
terrain in any detail. What I will take from it, however, is a sharpened sense of both the exclusivity and 
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6  J. WyLIE
the desire for internal homogeneity inherent, if often latent, within homeland thinking. On the one 
hand—as Kaplan and many other have noted (e.g., Gregory, 2011)—the discourse of homeland security 
produces a divisive imaginative geography in which the world is invidiously segregated into selves 
and others, those who belong and those who do not, ‘home’ and ‘not-home’. On the other, the gaze of 
security is also simultaneously turned inwards, and there thus occurs an ever-finer examination of the 
credentials of those who claim to belong. As a consequence, the project of homeland security is, it may 
be argued, inevitably an anxious, paranoid and self-defeating one. The desire to immunise against all 
difference on the ‘inside’ precipitates an auto-immune response in which the integrity and cohesion of 
the homeland becomes a matter of perpetual ambiguity and doubt—a situation exemplified, no less, 
by the American TV series, Homeland.
Because of this impossible and self-defeating desire for purity, a homeland is thus always already a 
space that is already internally displaced. It is somewhere unable, in other words, to fully recognise and 
name itself. This casts an interesting shadow upon a word and idea which had previously appeared in 
many ways innocuous and benign. Until recently in academia, homeland was a term most commonly 
coupled with diaspora, and was a standard point of reference within studies of migration, post-coloniality 
and identity (see Safran, 1991; for an inaugural examination). A homeland here, of course—with the 
experience of Jewish peoples as exemplary—is understood to be the original home of a diasporic 
and exiled population, a site from which they have dispersed, but to which they continue to refer as a 
marker of collective identity, as a source of continuing emotional allegiance, and a as bulwark against 
the estrangement of inhabiting ‘foreign’ spaces. Thus, as Kaplan (2003, pp. 84–86) writes, ‘homeland 
connotes an inexorable connection to a place deeply rooted in the past … Homeland thus conveys a 
sense of native origins, of birthplace and birthright. It appeals to common bloodlines, ancient ancestry, 
and notions of racial and ethnic homogeneity’.
It is precisely these kinds of associations that concern me here, of course—it is precisely because 
of homeland thinking’s stress upon origins, roots and belonging, that I am arguing for an alternate 
thought of landscape that moves in favour of the unsettled and the differentiated, and that presumes 
no essential link between a land and its inhabitants. But just as ‘homeland security’ necessarily harbours 
tendencies to self-destruct, so it can be shown that homeland conceived in terms of diaspora and return 
is equally conflictual. The point of origin for a diasporic group, for instance, may be so far removed in 
the past so as to be more myth or dream than actuality. Equally, in many instances the homeland may 
no longer ‘wholly’ or ‘properly’ exist, it may be divided, colonised or submerged. A homeland may also 
have never existed, or may exist only within a repeatedly deferred future, as the aspiration that marks 
the wanderings of the diaspora.
But most notably of all, we can argue that a homeland only comes to exist once there is exile and 
displacement. As I noted earlier, a homeland is always a place of desired return, thus it is never where 
one at present dwells, it is always instead somewhere distant. Homeland shimmers into existence as 
something already lost, remote and absent. Exile and displacement are, in a strong sense, the very 
preconditions of any thought of homeland. Uprootedness is originary, we might say—and yearning 
for a return to one’s roots is an inherently paradoxical or aporetic feeling—there being, in principle, no 
roots, no original place. This is Kaplan’s verdict:
the homeland is created not out of unbroken connections to a deeply rooted past, but from the trauma of severance 
and the threat of abandonment. A homeland is something a larger power threatens to occupy or take away, and 
one has to fight to regain. The word homeland has a kind of anxious redundancy, home and land, as though trying 
to pin down an uneasy connection between the two that threatens to fly apart. (ibid., p. 90, original emphasis)
She goes on to draw out further the implications of the fact that any sense of homeland is predicated 
on its absence. Even if one were to physically return, the homeland would not be found again, the past 
is irretrievable. The suspicion would surely dawn that there had never been a homeland to start with. 
In this sense, far from constituting some existential anchorage or bedrock, homeland connotes a kind 
of untethered doubtfulness. In extremis Kaplan argues that it becomes precisely the opposite: ‘the 
homeland … proves a fundamentally uncanny place, haunted by prior and future losses, invasions, 
abandonment. The uncanny, after all, in Freud is a translation of unheimlich, the ‘unhomely’. The 
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homeland is haunted by all the unfamiliar yet strangely familiar foreign spectres that threaten to turn 
it into its opposite’ (ibid.).
5. Unsettled landscapes
At this point, before concluding and prospecting forwards, I will summarise my arguments thus far:
•  ‘What is the problem for which landscape is the answer?’ This is a fascinating question, because its 
format obliges us to define landscape in terms of a response, an agenda, a research programme.
•  What is the problem? Ontopology, or ‘homeland thinking’—the assumption of a binding connection 
between land and life, a shared nativity.
•  Unsettling homeland thinking is thus a critical agenda for landscape research—but the further 
issue is that landscape itself is historically and conceptually freighted with such thinking. It is 
difficult to disentangle phenomenological approaches in particular from this inheritance.
•  yet, even a brief analysis of the term homeland reveals it to be not only complex and multi-faceted, 
but also constitutively divided within itself, never fully present to itself.
A landscape cannot be a homeland—cannot aspire to be such—because there are no such 
homelands for us to inhabit. There are no original inhabitants.
I was in the midst of preparing this paper when I noticed a new article appear on the website of 
cultural geographies—a paper by Hayden Lorimer (2014), called ‘Homeland’.1 This is the latest in an 
impressive sequence of landscape stories by Lorimer, set in the highlands of Scotland. Or perhaps 
‘bio-geographies’ would be a more accurate description, given Lorimer’s interest in the intricacies of 
land and life forms. Here, in the context of a family history, homeland is defined with some subtlety. It 
emerges through, and abides within, ‘the emotional geographies of topography … coaxed from feelings 
of attachment and estrangement, intimacy and remoteness, togetherness and individuality’ (p. 584).
On reading this, and not for the first time, I experienced doubts. Was my argument about landscape 
and homeland already too severe? Shouldn’t I compromise? Couldn’t a story of homeland and belonging 
not also be a story about transience and distancing? Is the key issue then more to do with the textures 
of our writing, rather than the purity of our concepts?
Turning back first to the postcolonial literatures in which homeland has been most extensively 
discussed, what of the many instances in which discourses of landscape and belonging are notable 
elements in the reassertion of indigenous identities and rights? While the very word ‘indigenous’ may 
be ontopological in its definition, does claiming that there are no original inhabitants not risk complicity 
with colonial desires to picture the landscape as empty, uninhabited, un-storied? In this context, care 
and criticality are needed. I hope that claiming a landscape cannot be a homeland may in fact be a 
means of further subjecting colonial suppositions to critique. Claims to possession and recognition may 
be as firmly in the ambit of a colonial proprietorial imaginary, as they are emergent from within any 
indigenous ontology, for example (see Cameron, de Leeuw, & Desbiens, 2014). Equally, the picturing 
of particular groups and peoples as distinctively land-locked may perpetuate, inadvertently or not, a 
hierarchy in which those peoples may be positioned as historically marginal.
More widely, another rejoinder to my arguments here could be that they seem to fly in the face 
of historical evidence and empirical actuality. I noted at the outset that this paper has a normative 
dimension, but of course it is also evident that many landscapes are the indisputable product of long-
duree inhabitation. They have evolved over centuries as both daily experience and symbolic freight. 
As noted above, the notion of settlement is in many ways integral to landscape. The task of much 
landscape research—landscape history and archaeology in particular—is precisely to bear witness 
to this ongoing settling, in its phases of both continuity and conflict. The rejoinder will thus be that 
it must be possible to speak about the close, deeply felt and time-rich connections between peoples 
and landscapes—pragmatically, beneficially and progressively—without necessarily succumbing to 
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essentialism, or subscribing to a belief in some form of autochthony, let alone to any kind of extremist 
‘blood and soil’ ethnocentrism?
Of course it is. Of course it is important to understand and testify to the values and investments people 
have in landscape. Of course we need subtle narratives of ‘home and its hinterland’ such as Lorimer’s. 
Of course it is vital to be alert to the iniquities of disinheritance and dispossession. But I do think it is 
of course also possible to think landscapes historically without necessarily subscribing to homeland 
thinking—it is not a question of a false choice between an idealistic vision and a factual ground. And I 
think we also need other arguments and principles as well. I chose a quotation by Emmanuel Levinas 
to headline this paper—a harsh quote: ‘one’s implementation in a landscape, one’s attachment to place 
… is the very splitting of humanity into natives and strangers’, (Levinas, 1990, p. 232). This quotation is 
taken from a short essay by Levinas inspired by the first spaceflight of the cosmonaut yuri Gagarin. In 
this essay, as so often, Levinas is looking to speak against elements of Heidegger’s philosophy, and here 
he is vitriolic in his criticism of a thinking he describes as ‘snuggled up inside the ‘Place’ (ibid., p. 231). 
Gagarin, by contrast, is praised for having escaped from the cloying confines of this kind of landscape, 
out into an abstract space.
I think that Levinas’s words do send a signal that landscape research would benefit from heeding? 
If I may draw closer to concluding through a personal example, I myself grew up in a disputed country 
(Northern Ireland) where, if they could only have admitted it, no one felt that they truly belonged. Those 
who aspired to a unified Ireland felt out of place in the northern dispensation, but distanced also to a 
degree from the world of the south. Those who identified with Britain felt estranged from an Ireland they 
nonetheless at least partly inhabited. Today there is a formal peace, but things remain unsettled. Any 
landscape must be a reckoning with such provisionality; a kind of dislocation or distancing from itself.
One positive direction in which this thinking could develop would be towards landscapes of 
welcome, hospitality and sanctuary—more vital to maintain than any cultural heritage. But I could 
also, in signing-off, emphasise ideas of dislocation and distance in other ways. In his essay Uncanny 
Landscape, Jean-Luc Nancy (2005) offers what is in some ways an antidote to the vision of gathering and 
homecoming presented in Heidegger’s Building Dwelling Thinking. Instead of landscape as a gathering 
in which dwelling can blossom, instead of any possible communion of being and location, landscape 
here serves to index an incessant spacing, dispersal and distancing. ‘The landscape’—I conclude with 
another definition—‘is the space of strangeness or estrangement..the land of those who have no land, 
who have lost their way’ (pp. 60–61). How might this be one pathway for landscape research?
Note
1.  I need to note here that I am currently one of the editors of cultural geographies.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
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